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Essay on the Bases of the Mystic Knowledge. By E. RÉCÉJAC. Translated by Sara Carr Upton. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.—pp. xi, 287.

'Science' has to do with objects, the sum total of the phenomena of experience. To the real subject of experience, to the essential will, it never penetrates. Here, in this extra-temporal realm, lie the infinite sources of our inspiration, inspiration to duty, to disinterestedness, to every form of high and noble living. Our relation in freedom to this infinite, which for us has the quality of an absolute, constitutes the mystic fact. This relation cannot be scientifically comprehended, for both its terms are transcendent, but it finds expression in consciousness in symbolic representations of the imagination formed on analogies from experience. Such, in substance, is the author's view of mysticism, a view characterized by its insistence on the symbolic nature of our relations with the 'Absolute' and its consequent rejection of the idea of a direct intuition of God. "The Absolute for us," he says, "is only a *reflection* which falls upon our life and idealizes it," and the question whence this reflection comes, every one answers for himself: the source is "known of the heart" by an act of faith. And the mysticism which is thus symbolic and personal is solely in the interest of a broadened and elevated moral life. In the elaboration of these ideas we have an interesting, and in general sober, discussion of the subject of mysticism, successfully vindicating a place for religion free from all possible assaults of science.

The translation is poor. It is necessary to say this frankly, for with our modern standards, a translation which is even only negatively good can no longer be tolerated. In the case before us, to be sure, when the original is not too difficult, it is usually rendered with fair literalness. But what shall we say of the English which speaks of grasping the truth "at one blow" (*d'émblée*), of Aristotle's "the good" as "nearer in practice" (*plus rapprochée de la pratique*), of our reason as "inclosed in to" its conditions; which writes habitually "in the hypothesis" (*dans*), "to the contrary" (*au*), and "in view of" (*en vue de*), meaning with the view or purpose of, *e. g.*, counteracting or expressing something; which tells us that the *εἰδωλα* of Democritus 'is,' as though that word were a singular, and that freedom is not enclosed in exact 'formula,' as though this word were a plural? Of inexactness in translation it would be possible to give many examples, but one may suffice. On p. 260 we read as follows: "In order that the will should detach itself morally from the ego, it is necessary that the Good, in its active form of Force should be reflected in the world once again, and should perform an act of independence, all the more remarkable in that it constitutes a state of consciousness." This, in the context, is unintelligible. In the original we read, "il faut que la Force, forme active du Bien, se réfléchisse en ce monde une dernière fois et fasse une acte d'indépendance encore plus remarquable que pour se constituer a l'état de conscience"—the very opposite of the translation. Of lack of familiarity

with philosophical writing, the following give evidence: "*the* mystic knowledge" (title), "*the* consciousness" (throughout), "sensorial being" (*l'être sensible*), "syndesis" (for synderesis), "*prae existens*," "*Fouillée Idées, Forces*," Spinoza, "*Traité theologico politico*"; and the list might be easily extended. We are told that the titles of works, out of fairness to the French author, are cited as given by him (hence *e. g.*, Sophocle, Edipe Roi !), but that the citations have been carefully compared with the English originals or translations. The correspondence is at any rate not always exact. See *e. g.*—the only cases the reviewer has cared to take the trouble to examine—the quotation from Hume on p. 209 (from the 10th essay, by the way, not the 12th), and from the Scriptures on pp. 219 and 256.

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Logic and Argument. By JAMES H. HYSLOP. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.—pp. vii, 249.

In the present confusion as regards the place which logic ought to occupy educationally, in view of the changes which are going on in logical doctrine, there are two general attitudes which are possible. We may, on the one hand, make logic a real introduction to the philosophy of the thought processes as the concrete instrument of growth in experience, using the traditional logic, perhaps, as a way of approach to this. Or we may frankly recognize the philosophical shortcomings of formal logic, and use it merely for what it is worth as a practical, if somewhat artificial, way of inducing such analysis as shall tend to greater clearness and exactness of thought and expression. Any very important results, however, can hardly be expected from this latter method, unless it is connected more closely than is commonly the case with the practical use which the student makes of his reasoning powers. It is therefore an excellent idea of Professor Hyslop's to connect with a text-book on elementary logic a consideration of its application to the art of argumentative discourse. This is effected chiefly by two special chapters on Explanatory Discourse, and on Proof and Argumentation, following the logical discussion of Terms, and Reasoning; and by an extended and well classified discussion of Fallacies. The treatment is necessarily more or less general, but is suggestive. The more strictly logical chapters seem to be well adapted for younger students. Definitions and explanations are for the most part full and clear, while the more difficult and technical parts of logic are treated only briefly. Ambiguities of expression and of classification, which are apt to puzzle students, are given special attention, and the distinctions drawn are helpful. There is an extended list of questions and examples.

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